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In his Spiegel interview of September 23rd 1966 Heidegger spoke of being 
‘shocked’ when he  ‘just now saw the photographs of the earth taken from the 
moon’ Ich bin jedenfalls erschrocken, als ich jetzt die Aufnahmen vom Mund zur 
Erde sah. (Heidegger 1976, 206) This statement came after the long and cautious 
account of his actions under National Socialism that makes up the first part of the 
interview and the controversial sentence from Introduction to Metaphysics 
concerning  the  ‘inner truth and greatness of this movement’  ‘innere Wahrheit und 
grosse dieser Bewegung -  namely ‘the encounter between planetary determined 
technics and the modern human’ ‘der Begegnung der planetarisch bestimmten 
Technik und des neuzeitlichen Menschen - (Heidegger 1976, 204).  But was the 
shock provoked by the Earth image enough to upset the frame and routines of 
Heidegger’s thinking or did it serve merely to confirm and illustrate them?  
 
 From the interview it seems that the citation of the planetary image served only to 
confirm Heidegger’s already established views that philosophy had been 
succeeded by cybernetics in the epoch of planetary technicity.  He immediately 
situates it within a cluster of thoughts already intimated in the 1949 Bremen lectures 
and the writings of the 1950s:  ‘We do not need atomic bombs, the uprooting of 
man is already here. We only have pure technical relations.  It is no longer an Earth 
on which humans live today.’   ‘Wir brauchen gar kein Atombombe, die 
Entwurzelung des Menschen ist schon da. Wir haben nur noch rein technische 
verhaltnisse. Das ist keine Erde mehr, auf der der Mensch heute lebt.’ (Heidegger 
1976, 206).  But did Heidegger see clearly? Is there a ‘planetary technics,’ a ’pure 
technical relation or does the picture call for other ways of thinking with technics ? 
Must viewing the planet from without necessarily eclipse the Earth and uproot its 
inhabitants? 
 
It is important at the outset to be clear about the precise images that so shocked 
Heidegger.  In his history of the imaging of the earth Earthrise: How Man First Saw 
the Earth (2008) Robert Poole describes the narrow range of whole earth imagery 
available in 1966.  It is necessary to attend carefully to this history in order to 
understand what was happening to the earth picture at the moment Heidegger 
encountered it, almost literally, on the eve of his Spiegel interview.  For the black 
and white extra-planetary images available in late summer 1966 were very different 
to the chromatic icons later generated by the manned Apollo missions.  The 
automatic Earth images from 1966 were generically distinct from the human 
photographic images of the planet earth taken by astronauts from 1968 using 
Hasselblad cameras, albeit without viewfinders.  The now iconic series of earth-
images from Apollo 8 (‘Earthrise' 1968) to Apollo 17 (‘Blue Marble’ 1972) was 
intiated more two years after Heidegger’s interview.  While these became the 
prevailing images of Earth as a human world - ‘our’ fragile planet - they were not 
the ones that Heidegger found shocking in 1966. 
 
The description given by Heidegger of the planetary images as seen ‘just now’  and 
taken of the Earth from the Moon allows them to be precisely identified. They are 
the two Earth images taken by the unmanned, robotic  ‘Lunar Orbiter 1’ nicely 
described by Poole as ‘an ingenious orbiting photographic laboratory’ (Poole, 72).  
The Lunar Orbiter missions were dedicated to securing map quality images of the 
lunar surface ahead of manned moon landings by the Apollo programme.  Lunar 
Orbiter 1 was launched on August 10th 1966 and successfully made and 
transmitted 413 images between the 18th and 29th of August. The first of the 
photographs referred to by Heidegger was taken at 16:35 GMT on August 23rd 
1966 followed by a second less striking photograph two days later.  The image was 
published in a NASA Press Release on September 14th 1966, less than two weeks 
before the Spiegel interview. 
 
 The accounts of ‘Philosophy after the Apollo Missions’ elaborated in Kelly Oliver’s 
Earth and World  (2015) and Benjamin Lazier’s article ‘Earthrise; or, the 
globalisation of the World Picture’ (2011)  implicitly privilege the humanly mediated 
Apollo 8 mission image of the planet ‘rising’ ‘above’ the Moon.  They do however 
note the uncanny quality of the non-human planetary images that preceded them, 
especially those produced by NASA’s Lunar Orbiter 1 mission seen by Heidegger.  
Although both writers are aware that the planetary photographs available to 
Heidegger in 1966  are robotic, automatically captured and processed images, the 
power of the imagery subsequently produced by the Apollo missions diverts them 
from a closer examination of Heidegger’s shock when confronted by the automatic 
planetary image. The terms of Heidegger’s description suggests he was shocked 
by the image’s ‘technical’ automatic character with its suggestion of an absence of 
human decision and control in their capture.  However, the robotic Lunar Orbiter 
photographs of the Earth were themselves aesthetically humanised by rotating the 
planetary images 90 degrees clockwise thus making the Earth appear as if it was 
rising up from a horizontally oriented moon surface rather than moving from left to 
right of a vertically oriented moon surface bathed in the light of the sun. A similar 
operation was performed on the Apollo ‘Earthrise’ images. producing humanly 
comprehensible substitutions of an Earth for a Sun ‘rise’ rather than, in the case of 
Lunar Orbiter and Apollo 8, an Earth displacement with respect to automatic 
camera, moon and an absent shared light source in the sun.   
 
While Kelly and Lazier locate Heidegger’s image in the Lunar Orbiter One mission 
they underestimate its significance as an automatic image. Yet it was automatic in a 
way that scarcely conformed to Heidegger’s view of technics or to his 
understanding of the encounter between modern humans and planetary technics.  
It was from the outset a problematic image emerging from a context of improvised 
contingency rather than the ‘pure technical relation’ imagined by Heidegger.  NASA 
released it (NASA 66-H-1146) in portrait format (fig. 1) respecting its technical 
vertical orientation and even adding a note ‘The Earth is shown on the left of the 
photo with the U.S, east coast on the upper left … the surface of the moon is shown 
on the right side of the photo’ (cited in Price, 76). However the image was 
disseminated in landscape format after rotating the image in order to make it 
appear as if the earth was rising above the surface of the moon (fig.2).  When re-
issuing the photograph a year later NASA explicitly stipulated the vertical 
orientation of the image adding that this would be the view of the Earth awaiting the 
astronauts as they orbit the Moon and ‘face the earth’.  Its lateral orientation - Moon 
to the right, Earth to the left - clearly deflates any hierarchy between the two cosmic 
objects sharing the light of an absent third.  Its subsequent however rotation 
restores the privileged place of the Earth in the scenario placing it in an analogous 
position to sun as seen from Earth.  The latter was the picture that the Apollo 8 
astronauts were expecting to see and had been trained to capture with their blinded 
cameras.  Yet this operation on the image making it into an ‘Earthrise’ was almost 
entirely fictional for, as Price notes, the Lunar Orbiter image was taken 
retrospectively as the robot disappeared  behind the moon making the image an 
‘Earthset’ rather than ‘Earthrise’ (Price 77).  The automatic images posed problems 
from the outset for human viewers, forcing them to adapt the automatic planetary 
image to fit human purposes and aspirations. 
 
The efforts to re-orient an automatic technical image are repeated at a 
philosophical level in Oliver and Lazier’s texts.  Oliver cites the image in its 
horizontal ‘Earthrise’ format, (Oliver, 34) making it consistent with her focus on 
philosophy after the Apollo missions: She visually aligns the Lunar Orbiter image 
that in her translation ‘frightened’ Heidegger (Oliver 152) with Apollo 8’s ‘Earthrise’.  
Lazier by contrast assumes Heidegger saw the vertical portrait images, reproducing 
the portrait format and commenting  ’it is easy to see how the photos he did have at 
his disposal (from Lunar Orbiter 1) might have been frightening in the extreme. 
They are  stark and  austere. They are also vertiginous in a way that the iconic 
“Earthrise" is not. They confound one of the presuppositions of phenomenological 
analysis, that the body has a customary orientation in space: up and down, front 
and back, above and below, before and behind.’ (Lazier 610).  While Oliver re-
orients the image into a precursor of ‘Earthrise’ Lazier stresses the challenge it 
poses to human orientation in thinking, with Earth and Moon alongside each other.  
 
In a sense both Lazier and Oliver are correct.  It is most likely that Heidegger saw 
the press versions of the image already converted into a horizontal proto-Earthrise 
format and so not the ‘vertiginious’ vertical portrait version cited by Lazier. This 
renders problematic Lazier’s argumentative step from the disorienting vertical 
image to a discussion of Husserl’s pre-Copernican character of everyday 
experience: the adapted ‘Earthrise' version is wholly consistent - has been made 
wholly consistent -with such a pre-Copernican experience. But Oliver’s citation of 
the Earthrise image runs the risk of allowing it, and Heidegger’s testimony in the 
Spiegel interview, to be too quickly aligned with an Arendtian sense of world 
alienation or estrangement (Oliver 152-3) and to miss a chance critically to reflect 
on the understanding of technics informing Heidegger’s shock at the automatic 
planetary image.    
 
Both Oliver and Lazier underestimate, even ignore,  the technical character of the 
image itself, preferring to cite it as a symbol for larger processes such as Oliver’s 
claim that for Heidegger ‘global technology’ is ‘symbolized by images of the Earth 
from the moon’ (Oliver 152).  Yet perhaps the nexus between the image, atomic 
warfare, cybernetics, ‘global technology’  and National Socialism evoked in the 
interview needs to be examined more closely, beginning with the image itself.  How 
far does the image conform to Heidegger’s understanding of planetary technics,  
and might it not point to a quite different understanding of the human encounter 
with technics.   At this point, Lazier’s perceptive comment regarding the ‘stark and 
austere’ character of the black and white images may prove a stronger point of 
departure for understanding Heidegger’s shock at the images than the question of 
the orientation of the Earth with the respect to the moon.  For the starkness and 
austerity of the images point less to the omnipotence of technics in uprooting 
humans from the Earth than to the limits of an analogue technology and a largely 
improvised human/technical interface or ‘encounter’. 
 
On November 13th 2008 NASA released a ‘recovered’ version of image 66-H-1146 
claiming that in 1966 ‘the technology did not exist to produce a full-resolution 
image’. (fig.3)  As part of the ‘Lunar Orbiter Image Recovery Project’  technicians at 
the NASA Ames Research Centre converted the  ‘data stored on magnetic tapes 
into a digital format using a combination of modern digital imaging technology and 
restored 1960s-era machinery’ 
(https://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/images/35906/earthrise-1966, last accessed 
3/7/2020).  The digitally true image was thus recovered or re-mastered from the 
analogue distortions of the ‘original’ by a fresh translation between analogue and 
digital technologies.  In the process the re-mastered Lunar Orbiter image 
approximated even more to the humanised aesthetic parameters of the Apollo 
images losing precisely the starkness and austerity noted by Lazier.  What seems 
to have happened in the process is that the automatic, analogue signature of the 
image is smoothed out in the digital translation and made less obtrusive.  The stark 
black and white contrasts of the original images were transformed into delicate 
tonal transitions producing a range of continuous differentiations of black and white 
analogous to the chromatic values of digital colour photography.  If we can 
understand better what has been filtered out in the process of digitally translating 
the image into a format and finish familiar to viewers of the Apollo images, we might 
understand better what it was that shocked Heidegger.  The change in the effect of 
the sunlight between the analogue and digital versions show how the  stark and 
austere qualities described by Lazier served to confirm the seamless and uncanny 
functioning of planetary technics for Heidegger in 1966 
. 
 
To do this it is necessary to understand more fully the technical processes of 
automated image capture at work in the Lunar Orbiter series and how these 
processes marked the images they produced.  The Lunar Orbiter was essentially 
an automated image capture, processing and transmission unit designed for close- 
range photography of the lunar surface. It was the technical response to the 
problem of capturing sufficiently high quality images of the lunar surface to co-
ordinate future manned landings on the moon with the technical limitation of not 
being able to return exposed negatives for processing on Earth.  The largely 
improvised technical solution to this problem involved a complex and fragile 
sequence of automated operations whose vulnerable improvised character left 
room for a degree of flexibility and openness to contingency.   It was this 
vulnerability, the impurity of the technical relation, that enabled the capture of Earth 
images that were neither planned nor included in the mission programme.  The 
images, in other words, were made possible by the frailty of an improvised and 
creaking technical sequence rather than by any pure technical a priori.   
 
Although the process of image capture logically begins with the exposure of a film, 
in the case of the Lunar Orbiter this was technically a late stage in a series of 
technical operations characterised by a low degree of feedback that stitched 
together various technical processes.  Since the moment of exposure was 
determined by the temporal process of development, scanning, transmission and 
printing  that succeeded it, the process once initiated would proceed with only a 
small degree of flexibility.  The process ‘began’ with the exposure of a 70mm film 
that moved through the camera without interruption at fixed intervals of time. The 
exposed film then moved through a dry development process - pioneered by 
military satellites on the secret Corona programme - in which the film was brought 
into contact with sticky developer and then heated.  This produced a photograph 
similar to a polaroid that was then sent for scanning by an electron beam and the 
quarter of a million lines individually transmitted via radio signals captured by 
tracking stations in California and Madrid.  The signals were translated to video 
tape, projected and then filmed with a movie camera.  The negatives were 
processed by Eastman Kodak in New York, cut into contact strips which were then 
printed as individual photographs.   
 
The leakage of information at all stages of this extremely heterogenous process 
accounts for the stark visual character of the image that shocked Heidegger.  It 
testifies not so much to planetary technical domination as to its fragile, imperfect 
working and exposure to contingency.  The image emerged from a technical 
process that was far from the seamless Gestell that Heidegger imagined and 
feared; instead it was the outcome of an improvised hook-up of various 
technologies - optical, chemical, mechanical and electro-magnetic.  The transitions 
between the diverse technologies constituted weak links in the technical sequence 
that at any moment risked its collapse - whether in the mechanical movement of the 
film from exposure to chemical development back to mechanical printing and then 
on to electro-magnetic  scanning, transmission and reception - but also provided 
openings for responding to chance opportunities provided by such a loosely 
articulated sequence. 
 
It is also important to recall that the mission of Lunar Orbiter 1 was determined not 
only by technical but also by political and economic constraints.  The already 
heterogenous technical sequence was over-determined by equally fragile 
translations between organisational and economic processes adapted to conflicting 
sites, interests and sources of feedback and interference.  This was far from the 
blackbox characterisations of the political relied upon by Heidegger in his global 
views of the the USA, USSR and National Socialist Germany.  Beyond its well-
known origins in the Cold War and its constant political struggles for funding, NASA 
itself was not a single black box but contained competing organisational, even 
cultural interests operating across a spectrum ranging from the conservative 
operational control administration at Langley, Virginia to the ‘hippies’ in the 
experimental Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) in California that had hosted among 
others James Lovelock who proposed the cybernetic Gaia hypothesis.  In addition, 
NASA worked with contractors, in this case Boeing, with both parties legally tied to 
contractual and incentive arrangements that provided the economic framework for 
the mission and the context of its technical sequences.  
 
 
NASA’s planning of the Lunar Orbiter mission was strictly governed by the mission 
objective of securing high quality images of the lunar surface for a future moon 
landing.  The flight plan did not include taking photographic images of the Earth or 
even the possibility for doing so.  Photographing Earth from a distance was not a 
declared objective of a mission dedicated to close-range photography of the moon.  
Price shows in his history that while there was interest among some NASA 
personnel in pursuing an Earth image, inspired in part by Stewart Brand’s whole 
Earth campaign and his button badges from Spring 1966 asking ‘Why haven’t we 
seen a picture of the whole Earth yet?’  this counter-cultural demand did not 
become a operational parameter of the mission, nor was it written into the technical 
sequence. The time available for capturing, processing and transmitting images - 
the latter determined by the lunar orbit itself and the loss of radio signal as the 
Lunar Orbiter went behind the moon -  was budgeted to transmit a fixed number of 
images of the lunar surface.   
 
A number of contingencies ensued that opened the barest possibility of capturing 
an Earth image.  It  was found that the chemical process of developing images was 
unexpectedly accelerated under operational conditions opening an interval of time 
sufficient to programme additional photographs.  The proposal to take a photograph 
of the Earth came out of JPL whose engineers showed that there was sufficient 
transmission time and chemical capacity to take one or two extra photographs.  
There was in short the recognition of an opportunity arising within certain 
parameters of the technical process that needed to be aligned with the rest of the 
technical sequence to realise a radical but extremely risky modification of the 
mission.  Retrospectively playing down the origins of this modification in the 
Californian ambience of the JPL , the justification issued by Langley Control for 
taking the two Earth photographs is couched in strictly scientific rhetoric “the 
purpose of the photograph was to obtain data, long of interest to scientists, on the 
appearance of the Earth’s terminator (line dividing sunlit and shadowed portions of 
the planet) as viewed from a distance of about 240,000 miles.” (NASA press 
release, cited Poole 75).  But whatever the arguments in NASA for including a 
photograph of the Earth, the economic and political risks of altering the mission 
were considerable and would test the political, organisation and technical 
parameters of the mission.   
 
The Lunar Orbiter was manufactured by Boeing who were not contractually oblliged 
to change the flight programme to include photographs of the Earth.  In order to 
take a photograph of Earth it was necessary to spin the entire Lunar Orbiter in order 
to move the camera from its focus on the Moon to the Earth behind it.  The request 
from NASA to Boeing to perform this risky manoeuvre was intially turned down, but 
a contractual technicality permitting bonuses for useful ‘photographic data’ and 
NASA assuming full financial responsibility for any consequences following from  
the manoeuvre led Boeing, in spite of the risk, conditionally to approve it.   In 
addition to economic constraints NASA’s programme manager Lee Scherer was 
also aware of political pressure on the mission and NASA; he reports fielding 
defensively a telephone call from the Chairman of the congressional committee on 
space sciences Joseph Karth about the manoeuvre only to be told ‘I don’t give a 
damn why you did it, but me and 200 million other Americans thank you.’ (cited in 
Poole, 75)  In this welter of technical, economic and political contingency the 
photograph was eventually taken at 16.35 GMT on August 23rd and came via the 
links between NASA and the world’s mass media to Heidegger’s attention about 
three weeks later. 
 
Heidegger of course remained unaware of these contingencies and the improvised 
and extremely fragile technical ensemble that eventually delivered the image to 
him.   He was shocked less by the thinness of the technical threads and the tissue 
of contingencies that allowed this image to come into existence than by its  
deceptive confirmation of an invincible technical domination of the planet.  He did 
not see the image for what is was - a product of technically mediated contingency - 
but ironically called on it to represent the invincible machinations of planetary 
technics.   
 
Walter Benjamin has shown that shock depends on a lived experience, an Erlebnis, 
that cannot immediately be elaborated into consistent and narratable experience or 
Erfahrung. In the interview Heidegger describes an Erlebnis that is on the contrary 
almost immediately elaborated into an experience framed in terms of his already 
existing understanding of planetary technics.  The shock indeed was minimal, if not 
dissembled, and was translated immediately into  a confirmatory experience that 
did threaten his existing philosophy of technics. He seems to have been shocked 
less by something new and unanticipated that upset or challenged his thinking but 
by an image that confirmed what he had always already thought.    Hence the 
almost automatic recursion to the terms and co-ordinates of the 1949 Brenen 
Addresses - atomic warfare, end of life on Earth and domination by the technical 
unthought in his immediate response to the automatic planetary image. But the 
speed of the immune shut down of the shock at the automatic planetary image also 
sugests that it perhaps posed more of a threat than Heidegger allowed.  
 
Before turning to the way Heidegger situated the Lunar Orbiter image with respect 
to warfare, technics and the horrific we should reflect a little on the further 
contingency of the image arriving literally days before the Spiegel interview.  Lutz 
Hachmeister’s Heideggers Testament: Der Philosoph, Der Spiegel und die SS 
exposes the careful staging of Heidegger’s interview on September 23rd 1966, of 
which the well-known embargo on its publication until after Heidegger’s death was 
but the culminating gesture of a carefully choreographed operation. The interview 
was conducted  by the editor of Der Spiegel Rudolf Augstein supported by his 
Geisteswissenschaft editor - Georg Wolff - who had been a member of the SS/SD 
during National Socialism and who along with other ex-SS members had played an 
ambiguous role in the early history of Der Spiegel.  It is not recorded whether 
Heidegger was aware of his interlocutor’s past although Wolff was ambivalently 
open about it, but regardless of this his discussion about his role in National 
Socialism with an ex-SS/SD member casts it in a different, perhaps even more 
interesting light.  The  view of the interview as a retrospective reckonng between 
the Volkisch SA and the SS factions of National Socialism over ‘the inner thruth and 
greatness’ of their movement makes the contained interruption of this carefully 
planned encounter by the arrival of the Lunar Orbiter images all the more 
significant. 
 
Heidegger’s first response to the shock of the image was to immunise it by adapting 
it to his existing thinking.  His cites it to facilitate a sensitive transition in the 
interview from an account of his actions as a short-lived National Socialist Rector of 
Freiburg University to his thoughts on planetary technicity. Der Spiegel  and 
Heidegger had agreed in advance that the interview would have two focii:  National 
Socialism and planetary technics and Heidegger skillfully manages the transition 
between them by evoking the experience of ‘shock’.  The way that he does so it 
revealing since he first asks Augstein and Wolff  ‘I don’t know if you were shocked? 
Ich weiss nicht ob sie erschrocken sind…’ (Heidegger 1976, 205) before specifying 
what they might have been by.  In this way the question might momentarily be 
taken to refer to what Heidegger has just said about technics, politics and the ‘inner 
truth and greatness’  of National Socialism before being switched to the recent 
planetary images.   
 
The transition between the two parts of the interview begins with Der Spiegel  
asking whether Heidegger used the phrase ‘inner truth and greatness’  of the 
National Socialist movement that appears in the 1953 publication of What is 
Metaphysics in the 1935 delivery of the lecture.  Heidegger insists that he did and 
that the ‘planetary movement of modern  technics’ is ‘a power (eine Macht ist) 
whose magnitude in determining our history can hardly be overestimated.  For me it 
is a decisive question as to how any political system and which one - can be 
adapted (zugeordnet werden kann) to an epoch of technicity.  I know of no answer 
to this question.  I am not convinced that it is democracy.’ (Heidegger 1976, 206)  
His reflection on planetary technics is initially framed in terms of power. Planetary  
technicity constitutes a power to which political systems must adapt and Heidegger 
is unsure whether democracy can provide a site for such an encounter;  National 
Socialism’s ‘inner truth and greatness’ however consisted precisely in the 
encounter between the power of planetary technics and that of the modern human.  
The latter however is insufficient with respect to planetary technical power: 
‘Technicity in its essence is something that man does not master by his own power’ 
Die Technik in ihrem Wesen ist etwas, was der Mensch von sich aus nicht bewaltigt 
(Heidegger 1976,  206   ).   Heidegger’s confrontation of the inequality between 
technical and human power shifts the terrain of the ‘essence’ of the human from 
power to ‘thinking and poeticising’.  Interestingly at this point he cites again the 
phrase ‘inner truth’ previously applied to National Socialism but now to the human 
establishing a distinction between the essence of technics as power and the human 
as ‘thinking and poeticising’.    
 
Having established a distinction between the essences of technics and the human 
Heidegger calls on the Lunar Orbiter images to stand for technical power as 
opposed to human thinking and poeticising.  He modulates his thought again at this 
point to argue that technics has ‘uprooted’ humanity, but does so by a reference to 
atomic warfare that allies it with the Lunar Orbiter images as images of destructive 
planetary technical power.  Heidegger then mentions his recent, early September 
discussions with Rene Char - to which we will return - and the militarisation of the 
Provence landscape, citing him as saying ‘that the uprooting of man that is now 
taking place is the end, unless thinking and poeticising again regain their non-
violent power.’    However the parallel movements between a shocking planet 
image to planetary technics and from atomic warfare to technics repeated here and 
stated earlier in the Bremen Address, points to a further unthought at play, this time 
warfare and specifically the Cold War.  After some nostalgic referenes to ‘home and 
rootedness in a tradition’ Der Spiegel bring Heidegger back the theme of the ‘world 
movement ‘ of technics and ask ‘whether it is bringing about an absolutely technical 
state or has done so already?’  to which Heidegger emphatically assents - Ja! 
 
Given the absolute technical state Der Spiegel proceeds to ask whether individuals 
or philosophy can influence ‘this web of fateful circumstance’ ; Heidegger responds 
that neither humanity nor philosophy can do so, and then offers the famous phrase 
‘only a God can save us’ - that is to say a source of power able to confront technical 
power.  Heidegger goes on to say that this must be thought otherwise since 
‘philosophy is at an end’ having been transformed into cyberbetics. What was once 
philosophy is no longer capable of responding in thought to the condition of 
planetary technicity.  Heidegger does however concede that  ‘the mystery of the 
planetary domination of the un-thought esssence of technicity corresponds the 
tentative, unassuming character of thought that strives to ponder this unthought 
[essence].’  With this Der Spiegel  returns to the question of National Socialism’s 
encounter with planetary technology posed in What is Metaphysics seeing it ‘as the 
last, worst, strongest and, at the same time, weakest protest against this encounter 
between "planetary technicity" and modern man?’  while linking this to ‘a certain 
polarity’ in Heidegger’s personal between nostalgia for ‘home’ ‘rootedness’ and the 
thinking of planetary technicity’.  Heidegger’s responds with a signature reversal of 
positions:   ‘It seems to me that your take on technics is too absolute. I see the 
place of humanity in the world of planetary technics not as an inextricable and 
inescapable doom, but I see the task of thought precisely in this, that within its own 
limits it helps man as such achieve a satisfactory relationship to the essence of 
technics’ (Heidegger 1976, 214).  Heidegger continues that while National 
Socialism went in the direction of thinking this satisfactory relation to technicsthis 
thinking was attempted by National Socialism ‘Those people, however, were far too 
poorly equipped for thought to arrive at a really explicit relationship to what is 
happening today and has been underway for the past 300 years’  (Heidegger 1976, 
214). Beginnings were also made in this direction in the USA and Heidegger asks 
‘And who of us would be in a position to decide whether or not one day in Russia or 
China very old traditions of "thought" may awaken that will help make possible for 
human a free relationship to the technical world?’  ( Heidegger 1976, 214).    
 
Here Heidegger begins to look beyond what he thinks he can see, opening himself 
to the truly shocking thought that it is his understanding of technics that confirms 
the unthought of its essence.  This is a position convincingly defended recently by 
Yuk Hui in his Recursivity and Contingency (2019) whose call for a multiple 
cosmotechnics in place of Heidegger’s planetary technicity is confirmed by 
Heidegger’s view of the automatic Earth image.  Perhaps  there is no ‘pure’ 
technical relation, perhaps technical power is an illusion and the contrast of 
technics and poetics  is misplaced and that the site of the encounter of planetary 
technics and the modern human is indeterminate and contingent. This would make  
openness to contingency - the inner truth and greatness of democracy - indeed the 
most promising site for the encounter of planetary technics and the modern human.   
 
In the interview Heidegger mentions that he has  just returned from a seminar with 
Rene Char near his home in Provence. In the last of the 1966 seminars at Le Thor 
held on September 9th ‘at the house of the poet by the lavender fields’ (Heidegger 
2003, 48) Heidegger and company discussed Heraclitus’s fragment 30 on the 
cosmos and the everliving fire.  The protocols of the discussion show Heidegger 
subtlely modulating Heraclitus’s understanding of cosmos from mere ‘order’ to ‘the 
way things belong to each other in the midst of a “common presence” (“commune 
présence”), as day and night are joined to one another in the manner we saw.” 
(Heidegger 2003, 50) to radiance or ‘the light of heaven’ understood as that which 
shines not for itself but for that  ‘upon whom it shines’ (Heidegger 2003, 51)  
Heraclitus’s cosmos, continues Heidegger,  is fire as ‘rising flame, brooding glow 
and the radiating light, along with the richness of contrasts which this equivocation 
makes possible… [it] never appears as something isolated, but shimmers 
ungraspably throughout everything’  (Heidegger 2003,  52)  Heidegger constrasts 
this understanding cosmos as radiant invisible living fire with the modern view of 
cosmology as the measurement and control of appearances through technics.  
 
 The automatic Earth images published almost to the day of the seminar were seen 
by Heidegger as shocking confirmation of the dominance of planetary technics.  But 
the Lunar Orbiter images can also be seen as showings of the Heraclitean cosmos 
- not only do they show day and night as one on Earth - NASA’s  ‘terminator line’ - 
but the entire image depends on the radiance of the sun illuminating Earth and 
Moon while not itself becoming an object of representation.  The equivocations of 
the image and the contingencies surrounding its making are closer to the 
shimmering light of the Heraclitean cosmos than to any pure technical relation.  The 
automatic Earth image does not put its viewers ‘in a position to make predictions 
about all and everything’  (Heidegger 53/4)  but rather to see the contingency of the 
cosmos and the technical and political improvisations and inventions with which it 
has to be encountered.  Heidegger remained incapable of seeing this and so 
unable fully to experience the shock of accepting contingency as the site for the 
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